We partition takeover bids into two groups: those that are deferred from the date of a toehold purchase, and those that are coincident with a toehold purchase. Coincident bids alone have approximately zero abnormal returns at bid/toehold, but deferred bids have negative abnormals both in the pre-bid interval (representing bid anticipation) and at announcement. Negative returns are puzzling because of the implication that intending bidders should never defer. We classify deferred bids into those that should optimally have been deferred, and those that should not by devising a risk-neutral valuation procedure to measure the value of the option to defer. The negative returns are traced to a sub-group of deferred bids that should optimally have been coincident. We conjecture why non-optimally deferring bidders should behave in this way.
Introduction
Event studies have consistently failed to document positive returns to acquirers of toeholds (toeholders), whether accompanied by a bid or not. Toeholds are pre-bid block purchases of equity when there is an intention to gain control of the target. Betton and Eckbo (2000) report that toeholders making bids gain only when their toehold is subsequently sold to a rival bidder, but this is uncommon. This evidence suggests the absence of a profitable target acquisition strategy in a competitive equities market. This is surprising given our finding that about 43 per cent of toehold acquirers elect to defer their offers past the time of an initial toehold purchase. The option to defer an offer is valuable when a bid made concurrent with a toehold purchase (a coincident bid) is more costly. Assuming a bidder can secure control by either bidding now or later, a bid is optimally deferred when the bidder has private information of a sufficient chance of a price decline in the target stock; else, a coincident bid is predicated in order to deter target management resistance. Potential entry by rival bidder may also influence the choice, for the deferral option has value only when competing bids are unlikely.
No evidence has been reported on the performance of bidders who opt to defer their bids past the date of their toehold purchase. This paper therefore seeks to redress this deficiency. Our task is twofold. First, we value the option to defer a bid once a toehold has already been purchased. Direct valuation using exact or numerical solutions is difficult because target stock volatility is affected by disturbances in the return-generating process caused by developments in the takeover process, and particularly if the first bid is contested.
To circumvent these valuation difficulties we value the option to defer by the binomial method using volatility implied by the bid once made. Second, we evaluate observed deferral choices to identify optimality. We document a strong, positive relation between abnormal returns at toehold announcement and bid deferral options that are valuable. The abnormal returns associated with optimal bid deferrals exceed the abnormal returns of deferred bids that are non-optimal, and which are negative. We conjecture that non-optimally deferred bids are attributable to bidders initially deferring their bid in the expectation of a target price decline given little interest from potential rivals, but who then launch a bid one the threat of a rival bid emerges. If so, bidding in a hurry these bidders pay higher premiums, greeted by market disapproval. Despite this, non-optimally deferring bidders behave rationally.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews argument and evidence in relation to the rationale for acquiring a toehold in a bidding context. The sample and data are described in the following Section. The analysis in Section 3 is followed by conclusions in the final Section.
Background
The received rationale for toehold purchases is the reduction of free rider costs (Grossman and Hart, 1980) . Minority shareholders who cannot influence the bid outcome have an incentive to reject the offer in order to participate in the value added by the bidder after acquisition of a majority shareholding. However, when the offer timing is recognized as a bidding strategy, a toehold plays a different role. The cost of deferring an offer is the risk that the merged value of the target to the first bidder will fall as control transfer is delayed.
Thus, when a deferred bid is considered optimal, purchase of a toehold by an intending bidder hedges this implicit short position. The toehold can therefore be sold at a profit in the (unexpected) event of a target stock price rise; if the target's stock price falls a bid can be mounted at a lower offer price. A key factor that impinges on the bid deferral decision is the likelihood of a rival bidder emerging. The first bidder has an advantage over a second bidder in that the first bidder has the option to sell the toehold to a rival bidder. Bid deferral increases the probability of a rival bidding first. If there is a high probability of a rival offer, an intending bidder is likely better off by mounting a coincident bid in order to be the first bidder.
If a bidding contest is likely, intending acquirers have an incentive to buy stock aggressively not only to maximize their acquisition of target stock at a lower pre-bid price but also to raise the price at which they may sell out (Burkart (1995) , Singh (1998) and Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) ).
No analytical models have been developed to explain the rationality of bid deferral.
Apart from Bris (1998) , virtually no direct evidence on these propositions has been reported.
Nor has evidence has been reported on the returns histories of bidders who mount bids coincident with a toehold purchase or bid later (and who are distinguished from toehold acquirers who do not bid). Instead, the extant evidence focuses on the shareholder wealth effects of single events. Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) examine stock price responses to SEC Schedule 13D (substantial shareholder) filings, and report positive abnormal returns accruing to target firms for all sub-samples, but returns for acquiring firms are weakly positive at best.
Less than 10% of 13D filings were followed by completed takeovers. Acquiring firms initially recorded a 2.04% mean abnormal return at 13D filing, but this had been offset by subsequent negative returns by the time the takeover was complete. For the UK, Franks and Harris (1989) report effectively zero abnormal returns accruing to bidders with or without toeholds except for unrevised and uncontested bids with toeholds 30%, for which bidders recorded a small 2.20% one-month gain. Van Hulle, Vermaelen and deWouters (1991) report zero abnormal returns even for Belgian bidders with large toeholds, and irrespective of bid outcomes. Sudarsanam (1996) additionally finds that smaller toeholds are associated with more rival bids than larger toeholds, and that larger toeholds do not alter the bid premium or the (posterior) probability of a control transfer. When a coincident bid is not made, a toehold purchase may be expected to signal an impending bid and cause a target stock price runup (Bishop, 1991) . 
3.
Sample and data
Our sample comprises 88 randomly-selected Australian initial toehold acquisitions from 1989 through 2000 either accompanied by a (coincident) bid or followed by a (deferred) bid. All bids (or offers) are first offers. Toeholds acquired by pension funds and other investment vehicles are excluded because they do not lead to an offer. Also excluded were toeholds building on earlier acquisitions. A further filter is that all offers are successful (i.e., result in control of a majority of target stock). This condition ensures that cross-sectional variations in offer premiums, toehold size and (importantly) the decision whether to defer an offer are not outcome-dependent. Hence, we are able to model the deferral choice without controlling for the prior probability of a control transfer. The Australian institutional setting relative to the US or UK confers a further simplifying benefit: the mandatory bid threshold is capped at just 20 percent of outstanding (and voting) target stock unless the bidder proceeds forthwith to an offer, so toeholds are rarely large enough to influence the offer outcome. In other words, the threshold is low enough to allow rivals also to acquire toeholds, none of which are so large that they pre-empt other toehold purchases. In using the dates of toehold acquisitions to identify the commencement of the bid deferral period we are confident that the size of toeholds is unlikely to be an important factor in influencing the length of the bid deferral interval, as our evidence confirms.
During the sample period, takeover and merger activity in Australia was regulated by Descriptive statistics are reported in Table I . More than half ( 88 50 ) of all toeholds sampled are accompanied by coincident bids made on the same day that a toehold acquisition is announced, or within the following eight days. All remaining bids are deferred bids, for which the length of the deferral period is measured by the number of calendar days from toehold announcement date to the bid date. Toeholds accompanying coincident bids roughly correspond to target shareholder tender pre-commitments that account for 23% of Betton and Eckbo's (2000) sample. Bids with toeholds also tend to be unrevised (60.0% of cases), uncontested (65.9%) and have a high success rate (71.6%), but have an indifferent level of initial target board acceptance (38.6%). A bid is defined to be successful when the bidder acquires 40% or more of the target's outstanding stock. For bids in general Betton and Eckbo (2000) and Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) report lower target acceptance levels at around 30%, but have similar success rates (68% and 79%, respectively). Toeholds are disposed of in 27.3% of cases, mostly to a rival bidder. The median toehold size is 14.65% of target stock and is not dissimilar to levels reported in prior studies, despite the 20% cap. The median bid premium is a low figure compared with both for previous Australian and overseas studies because it is not a final bid premium and is calculated with reference to the target stock price on announcement day -3 and not a much earlier date to precede a possible runup (often day -90) day. This is done in order to allow separate observation of runups and bid premiums, the latter being set in relation to immediate pre-bid target stock prices. Median bidder size is about four times that of targets as measured by book value of total assets 2 .
Deferred bids have marginally higher success rates than coincident bids (75.6% vs. Bidder cumulative abnormal returns are reported in Table 2 . Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated according to Dodd and Warner (1983) . Target returns are not relevant to this study so they are not reported. The pre-toehold and pre-bid announcement intervals are set at days [-11, -2] in relation to a day 0 announcement. This interval is not intended to be so long as to capture all possible anticipation. Rather, it is long enough to show whether there was anticipation or not, for an absence of anticipation over the immediatelypreceding short interval also suggests an absence over longer interval. Although coincident bids are accompanied by toehold acquisitions, abnormal returns for coincident bids are shown under the bid announcement classification. There are several regularities. Coincident bidder returns are generally zero, but median CARs are slightly negative at bid announcement.
Deferred bid CARs around toehold do not differ significantly from zero, indicating that toeholds are not anticipated, but subsequent or deferred bids are. Around a deferred bid significantly negative bidder CARs are observed, and these are even higher in the preannouncement interval. Taken at face value, it would appear that deferring a bid is not a profitable strategy. This creates a puzzle, because if this were always so we would never observe deferred bids. We proceed to resolve the puzzle: negative returns are localised on bidders who should optimally have made coincident bids, i.e., should not have waited to bid.
To show this we value the option to defer using a posterior measure of volatility.
Analysis
Toeholders defer bids in order to benefit from a lower target stock price. If the stock price is not expected to fall, it is optimal to bid immediately, but if future stock price movements are uncertain the intending bidder rationally calculates the value of the option to defer. Arrival of a bid resets target stock price volatility, so any form of historically-derived volatility will impart error to valuation of the option to defer a bid. Since our sample comprises ultimately successful bids, target stock prices will always move in the direction of an anticipated bid. This is usually upwards, but the stock price may also fall if the anticipated bid is below market (i.e., the bid reveals 'bad' news about the target). In the absence of a bid, the target stock price is not expected to increase, but the stock still has volatility. Once a bid emerges, we assume this volatility is log-normal symmetric. For instance, a stock price rise in anticipation of a bid is mirrored by a proportionately equivalent stock price fall. We are therefore able to use the initial branching of a binomial lattice to value an intending bidder's payoffs for defer/not defer. For deferred bids, the target stock price at bid is mirrored by another stock price representing the opposite price movement since toehold acquisition. The stock prices on each branch are then subtracted from the bid observed at the end of deferral interval to obtain the payoffs, enabling valuation of the option to defer using standard risk-neutral valuation techniques pioneered by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) . Figure 1 illustrates application of these techniques. 
is the before-tax cost of debt, k is the cost of equity, D is the market value of debt and E is the market value of equity. ; else do not defer. Intuitively, a bid is deferred when the gain from deferral is less than the gain from bidding immediately (i.e., at toehold). In the present context a gain means a saving that results from securing control of the target at a lower offer price. Table 3 shows cumulative abnormal bidder returns for deferred bids by optimality as determined by the risk neutral valuation method just described. 38 15 deferred bids are found to be sub-optimal, that is, they are bids which should rationally not have been deferred when the toehold was purchased. In considering weaknesses of our model, we realise it is possible that the present value of the (actual) deferred bid may not be a good surrogate for an equivalent coincident bid (at toehold) in the context of a bidding contest. For example, a present value does not value alternative outcomes, such as selling the toehold to a rival bidder. The findings are highly supportive: strongly negative [-11, -2] CARs are exhibited for the non-defer group (median = -.0401) and these flow into the [-1, 0] CARs at announcement (median = -.0112).
The results for non-deferral bids suggest (i) these toeholds are anticipated, and (ii) a penalty is imposed by the market deferring when not optimal to do so. Bids that are optimally deferred are doubtless also anticipated, but show returns insignificantly different from zero. Posttoehold returns are normal. Pre-toehold anticipation by the market of deferred bids that should not have been deferred is remarkable given the zero CARs exhibited for deferred bids generally in Table 2 . To demonstrate confidence in our results we further show in Table 4 that a 'closeness of choice' variable is positively related to the pre-and at-toehold CARs for all deferred bids. CLOSENESS is measured by
We subject the non-optimal bid deferrals to further empirical scrutiny. It turns out that this group defers for a much shorter interval than optimally-deferred bids: the median deferral interval is 99 days versus 240 days, respectively. Further, non-optimally deferring bidders have a median bid premium of 13.33% in contrast to a 4.76% premium for optimally-deferring bidders: the difference is significantly different at the 1% level. Moreover, non-optimally deferring bidders exhibit twice target management bid acceptance rate (67% versus 35%) which favors a coincident bid, and is reinforced by higher target management blockholdings (18.44% versus just 5.45%) that characterize non-optimally deferred bids. This group also has just over half the incidence of rival bids (13% versus 22%), and has higher beta risk (1.20 versus .75). The story seems to be that non-optimally deferring bidders should not have waited to bid given better initial target management acceptance, but not having bid at toehold then did not wait long enough. This sub-group also paid higher bid premiums, yet had relative fewer rival bids to contend with down the track. We lean toward the latter regularity for an answer. Our conjecture is that non-optimally deferring bidders originally deferred because there was a lower perceived chance of a competing bid, and in so doing were hoping that the target stock price would eventually fall thereby enabling a cheaper acquisition. If so, then on emergence of a potential rival they finish up bidding in a hurry at a higher premium than in the first place to secure control. Despite their ex post mistake, non-optimally deferring bidders behave rationally. Unfortunately, potential rivals are difficult to observe because in our sample all first bids are ultimately successful.
Conclusion
Prior evidence has documented zero or slightly negative bidder abnormal returns in general. We replicate this finding for a sample of Australian bids. We partition bids into two groups: those that are deferred from the date of a toehold purchase, and those that are coincident with a toehold purchase. Our first finding is that coincident bids alone have approximately zero abnormals at bid/toehold, but deferred bids have negative abnormals both in the pre-bid interval (representing bid anticipation) and at announcement. Negative returns are puzzling because of the implication that intending bidders should never defer. We classify deferred bids into those that should optimally have been deferred, and those that should not by devising a risk-neutral valuation procedure to measure the value of the option to defer. The negative returns are traced to a sub-group of deferred bids that should optimally have been coincident. This is our second finding. Why intending bidders sub-optimally defer their bids is conjectured and remains an open question amenable to future research. ψ reported under bid announcement ***two-tailed significance at 1% ** two-tailed significance at 5% * two-tailed significance at 10% Table 3 . Cumulative abnormal bidder returns at toehold for deferred bids by optimality Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated according to Dodd and Warner (1983) . A coincident bid is made on the same day a toehold acquisition is announced or within eight calendar days of that date; bids after this date are deferred bids. The optimality of a deferred bid is determined in relation to a risk-neutral valuation process. 
